The (il)legal Indian: the Tupinambá and the juridification of indigenous rights and lives in North-Eastern Brazi by Zoettl, P. A.
 Repositório ISCTE-IUL
 
Deposited in Repositório ISCTE-IUL:
2019-04-23
 
Deposited version:
Post-print
 
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
 
Citation for published item:
Zoettl, P. A. (2016). The (il)legal Indian: the Tupinambá and the juridification of indigenous rights
and lives in North-Eastern Brazi. Social and Legal Studies. 25 (1), 3-21
 
Further information on publisher's website:
10.1177/0964663915593412
 
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Zoettl, P. A. (2016). The (il)legal Indian: the
Tupinambá and the juridification of indigenous rights and lives in North-Eastern Brazi. Social and
Legal Studies. 25 (1), 3-21, which has been published in final form at
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0964663915593412. This article may be used for non-commercial
purposes in accordance with the Publisher's Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Use policy
Creative Commons CC BY 4.0
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in the Repository
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Serviços de Informação e Documentação, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL)
Av. das Forças Armadas, Edifício II, 1649-026 Lisboa Portugal
Phone: +(351) 217 903 024 | e-mail: administrador.repositorio@iscte-iul.pt
https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt
1 
 
THE (IL-)LEGAL INDIAN. THE TUPINAMBÁ AND THE JURIDIFICATION OF 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND LIVES IN NORTH-EASTERN BRAZIL 
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The article traces different aspects of the present-day juridification and judicialization of 
indigenous lives using the example of the Tupinambá Indians of the Brazilian north-east. 
The Tupinambá’s identity is being increasingly bureaucratized by public administration 
and is constantly being questioned by public and private agents, in order to deny the 
Tupinambá’s constitutional land rights. In the course of the still ongoing process of the 
demarcation of the Indigenous Territory Tupinambá de Olivença, indigenous inhabitants 
are facing a plethora of civil actions, and Tupinambá leaders are being persecuted and 
criminalized by the Federal Police and the judiciary. The article exposes the legal 
intricacies of possessory actions against indigenous people in Brazil, and discusses the 
different acts and attitudes of the actors of the Brazilian “juridical field” as regards 
indigenous rights. It suggests a view of law, law enforcement and law suits as means of 
social sense-making, that is, a public staging, interpretation, imagining and “mapping” of 
Brazil’s “indigenous question”, which has, ultimately, to be legitimized by society at 
large. 
Brazil, indigenous identity, indigenous rights, legal anthropology, territorial disputes, Tupinambá Indians 
One day while I was “hanging around”, yet again, at the local office of the Brazilian Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (FUNAI) in the city of Ilhéus, north-eastern Brazil, a middle-aged man 
showed up, asking one of the officials on duty for a “declaration” of Indianness for his 
daughter. Being used to such demands, the official gave her stock response, saying that such 
declarations did not exist, nor was there a local “register” of indigenous people, but that the 
man’s daughter could always, if she deemed it necessary, fill in one of the “auto-declaration” 
forms which the Bureau provided. As the man insisted on receiving a “declaration” from the 
Bureau itself, the officials started to inquire as to his family’s origins and the indigenous 
village he belonged to. It turned out that the man was not actually living in one of the 
Tupinambá villages close to Ilhéus, but in the city itself, and that it was the university 
administration in Salvador, the state capital of Bahia, 400 km by road to the north, that was 
demanding proof of Indianness from his daughter. As the FUNAI officials started to entertain 
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some doubts about the man’s claims of indigenous identity, it was agreed that he should 
return another day, accompanied by one of the caciques (chiefs) of the area who would be 
able to bear testimony to his and his daughter’s belonging to the Tupinambá community. 
In the course of this article, I will discuss three elements of the juridification of indigenous 
lives in Brazil, using the example of the Tupinambá Indians from the north-eastern state of 
Bahia: the bureaucratization and challenging of indigenous identity, the question of 
indigenous land rights and the possessory proceedings against indigenous peasants, and, if 
briefly, the criminalization of indigenous leaders committed to the demarcation of the 
Tupinambá territories. By tracing the intricacies of the juridical treatment of indigenous 
identity, land and civil rights, I’m seeking to demonstrate the complexity of the interplay of 
law, legal procedure and the public enactment of justice and “justness” in the case of the 
Tupinambá. Drawing on, on the one hand, Geertz’s rather “interpretative” or “hermeneutical” 
and, on the other hand, Bourdieu’s rather “functionalist” approach to the nature of law and 
jurisdiction, I will then try to “make sense” of the Tupinambás’ juridical experience from a 
perspective that gives priority to the dynamics of proceedings over legal texts or the process 
of law making. Eventually, I will suggest that the legal battle which involves Tupinambá 
Indians, estate owners, the Federal Police, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and a number of 
public authorities, and which is fought out in a seemingly interminable juridical back and 
forth between first instance courts, courts of appeal and, recently, the country’s Supreme 
Court, is not only a paradigm of the difficulties of juridical resolution of social conflicts, but 
constitutes, in itself, a performative “enactment” of societal disputes that go well beyond the 
Tupinambá’s particular case. 
The local office of FUNAI in the city of Ilhéus (home to Brazil’s probably best known 
writer, Jorge Amado), as a matter of fact, although unwillingly, does issue certain types of 
documents related to the question of the “Indianness” of the petitioner. Such documents are 
sometimes required by public institutions such as universities, as indigenous applicants may 
benefit from special admission quotas, like students of Afro-Brazilian origin. Although the 
Convention No. 169 (Art. 1.2) of the International Labour Organization, ratified by Brazil in 
2002, as well as a recently promulgated federal Brazilian law on university quotas,
2
 relies on 
the principle of “self-identification” or “self-declaration”, on a more local “scale” of mapping 
of indigenous rights – to borrow an image from the Portuguese legal sociologist Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos (1987) – things work differently. Candidates for the Federal University of 
Bahia (UFBA), for instance, have to provide proof of their “condition” of Indianness, “by 
means of a certificate of […] FUNAI” (UFBA 2014: Art. 6.1) when applying for one of the 
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two extra places for “indigenous villagers” (índios aldeados).3 Ringing up UFBA’s “Pro-
rectorate for Affirmative Actions and Assistance to Students”4 (PROAE) in late 2014, I was 
informed that to apply as an indigenous student to one of the “Perseverance” fellowships,5 
one would have to produce an auto-declaration and a FUNAI certificate – although the 
corresponding decree lists these documents as alternatives (MEC 2013: Anexo I.II). 
This is just one example of the increasing bureaucratization of indigenous lives I was 
witnessing during my fieldwork in Ilhéus, Bahia. Whereas Brazilian law endorses the 
principle of indigenous self-identification, local government agencies often prefer to rely on 
“hetero”-identification or ascribed identity. Indigenous people see themselves as constantly 
obliged to “prove” their Indianness, be it when applying for a place at university, a job as an 
(indigenous) school teacher or a pension as an (indigenous) rural worker. The requirement of 
such evidence of identity is often extralegal, even if the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) in 
2012 confirmed the constitutionality of both the principle of “hetero-” and auto-identification 
(STF 2012: 37f). Moreover, FUNAI officials have become wary of the danger of acting as, or 
being considered to be acting as, a kind of “certification authority” for indigenous identity. 
FUNAI servants in Ilhéus, for instance, had to report to the Federal Police, as a consequence 
of alleged pension scheme frauds in which FUNAI declarations were part of the indigenous 
applicant’s file. As a consequence, the certificates issued by FUNAI Ilhéus have undergone 
frequent revisions. The one for “educational purposes”, at the time of my fieldwork in Ilhéus, 
was basically not certifying anything of itself, but merely confirming, in a nearly 
unintelligible multi-clause sentence, that “according to the declaration of the cacique” and 
that of another “four community leaders”, the person concerned would be a Tupinambá 
Indian, living at this or that place. As one of the officials joked, this latest version of the 
certificate would hopefully prevent them from being prosecuted by the Federal Police as a 
quadrilha (criminal organization). 
The making and unmaking of Indianness 
The question of who is, and who is not, a “legitimate” Indian6 has become a matter of public 
concern in Brazil. Especially (but not exclusively) in the country’s north-east, home to many 
of the country’s indigenous groups that have only relatively recently managed to successfully 
reaffirm and reclaim their indigenous identity and rights (see, for instance, Oliveira 2004), 
interest groups linked to the country’s thriving agribusiness have managed to put the 
“indigenous question” on the front line of the political agenda and public media discourses. 
Media reports on alleged “bogus” Indians often go hand in hand with accusations that FUNAI 
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and anthropologists are complacent accomplices in the “making up” of indigenous people, in 
places where, in reality, there would only be farm workers of mixed descent who had long 
abandoned their “original” Amerindian culture. A very contemporary example of the 
innumerable communication media that draw upon this “bogus Indian” discourse is the 
infamous (among anthropologists) web log Questão Indígena (Indigenous Question) which, 
to cite just one of the many posts that question the legitimacy of the Tupinambá’s ethnic 
identity, has recently reported on the occupation of a fazenda (country estate) by Tupinambá 
Indians by saying that: 
Around 100 Afro-Descendants who adopted indigenous identity to claim other people’s lands in southern 
Bahia once again occupied fazendas in the region of Ilhéus and Olivença. The areas had already been 
invaded, but the Federal Police removed the indigenoids [indigenóides] by virtue of eviction orders. 
According to the “cacique” Sinval Tupinambá, one of the group’s leaders, [the Indians] discovered that the 
judiciary had suspended the eviction orders and therefore decided to newly occupy the fazendas.7 
Tellingly, the blog’s corresponding Facebook page uses as its profile picture a drawing of 
a white man holding a mask in front of his face, which supposedly turns him into an Indian.
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Popular magazines like Época or Veja, available nationwide, take a similar line. Media 
reports from Veja or Época have not only exerted significant influence on the Brazilian 
middle class’s assessment of the indigenous “question” but, interestingly, also found its way 
into the records of legal cases. In one of the possessory lawsuits filed at the Court of Federal 
Justice of Ilhéus (to which I will return later), for instance, the landowner, in a petition in 
which he questions the demarcation of “that newest Indigenous Reservation of 480 square 
kilometres […] intended for the accommodation of pseudo-Indians Tupinambá who have 
never lived there”, annexes a report of Veja (Brazil’s biggest illustrated magazine) on the 
“Jamboree of opportunist anthropology” (2010) as evidence for his deliberations.9 An article 
headlined “Lampião Tupinambá” (which could be translated as “Billy the Kid Tupinambá”)10 
from the magazine Época (edited by Latin America’s largest mass media group Globo), in 
turn, is cited by the federal judge of another possessory action as documentary evidence for 
the “notoriety” of land occupations by indigenous groups in southern Bahia.11 In the Época 
article cited by the judge, Babau (the cacique of the indictees) features as “one of the leaders 
of a group of 3,000 individuals who name themselves Tupinambá” and who, “together with 
his band” supposedly had “invaded” more than 20 fazendas in the area. 
As Brazil’s constitution of 1988 guarantees extensive rights to the country’s indigenous 
population (which have only been partly and often unwillingly implemented by the successive 
post-military governments), to deny indigenous people their Indianness altogether has become 
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the core strategy of stakeholders who see their own – mostly economic – interests endangered 
by claims based on these rights. In yet another possessory action against the “Indigenous 
Tupinambá community of Olivença”, the plaintiff characterizes the defending party as 
“invaders, tagged as ‘Indians’, who get together, dress their heads with plumage, daub their 
bodies with paint [and] invade private properties […]”. In the same case, the federal judge of 
the court of first instance even falls back on the travelogues of the German Prince Maximilian 
of Wied-Neuwied to argue against the Indianness of the defendants. Wied-Neuwied had 
visited the Jesuit Indian Mission of Olivença near Ilhéus during his expedition to Brazil in 
1815–17. In the account of his journey, Wied-Neuwied (1820: 82) expresses his regrets on the 
fact that the “dark skinned Indians” he caught sight of on the beach of Olivença did not 
entirely equal the Tupinambá he had read about in Lery’s Histoire d’un voyage fait en la terre 
du Brésil, published more than 200 years before (in 1578). The federal judge of Ilhéus, in his 
judgment dating from early 2012, willingly embraces Wied-Neuwied’s chagrin, citing the 
prince’s deliberations for over a page as evidence for the fact that “already at that time [the 
Tupinambá Indians] dressed, spoke, worked and behaved like people that had integrated into 
the culture of the White”.12 Wied-Neuwied’s remark that the indigenous people he met in 
Olivença had “unfortunately lost their original characteristics” and his frustration at “not 
seeing a Tupinambá-warrior approaching” are both reproduced in bold print in the judge’s 
statement (ibid.). 
The use of ethnic belonging (and its denial) for the purpose of settling more or less local 
conflicts of interests is of course not exclusive to Brazil’s so-called “cocoa coast” (before the 
Second World War, the region around Ilhéus was one of the world’s biggest cocoa 
producers). Comaroff and Comaroff (2009), for instance, have assembled a minute account of 
the uses of ethnicity in what they call the “lawfare” of (and against) indigenous people in 
North America and Southern Africa. In what concerns the village of Olivença and its 
Tupinambá inhabitants, Marcis (2004) points to the long history of indigenous resistance 
against their cultural and physical extermination by colonial and postcolonial Brazilian 
society, emphasizing the importance of concepts of ethnicity in the constant struggles 
between the native inhabitants and the white elite from Ilhéus. After the foundation of Vila 
Nova de Olivença by Royal Charter in 1758: 
Affirmation of their ethnic identity turned out to be fundamental to the indigenous population for the 
preservation of their lands, costumes and culture, as, to the extent that the [indigenous] groups became more 
dependent on dominant society, colonizers and authorities declared them to already be “civilized”. Thus 
confounded with the other inhabitants [of Olivença], the Indians would lose their rights to the lands of the 
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[former] missionary settlements, which would be converted into common lands [and consequently] split up 
into parcels to be redistributed among [Indian] descendants and other interested parties. (Marcis 2004: 56) 
However, at that time, the Indianness of its inhabitants was not only decisive for the native 
population of Olivença, but also for the white elite from Ilhéus who had started to establish 
itself in the Vila, after the extinction of the Jesuit mission. As Marcis relates, “the indigenous 
condition of the Vila became a double-sided prerogative: it was negated, on the one hand, in 
consequence of the extinction of the mission, but it guaranteed, on the other hand, the very 
existence of the Vila as a[n independent] political and administrative unity” (2004: 69f). Even 
though the Alvará Régia of 1680 and the Land Tenure Act of 1850 guaranteed, in principle, to 
the indigenous population preferential rights over the lands they possessed (either as 
successors of the Jesuit mission or as its primary occupants), in practice, these rights were 
“constantly violated by private individuals and authorities” (see Marcis 2004: 56, 67, 69). As 
soon as the ethnic identity of the primary inhabitants of Olivença ceased to work to the 
advantage of the local elite from Ilhéus, it became challenged altogether. Towards the end of 
the 19th century, Vila de Olivença was “administratively declared ‘extinct’, for [an alleged] 
lack of any sign of proper ‘indigenous’ life among its inhabitants” (Viegas 2007: 18). 
This very brief account of the history of Olivença, at the present-day gateway to the, 
fiercely disputed and still not demarcated, Indigenous Territory Tupinambá de Olivença, may 
give an idea of the perpetual historical need of the indigenous population to aver its ethnic 
identity. The fact that Brazil’s Indians, in what concerns the imperative of permanent 
vindication of their ethnic belonging, find themselves in almost the same situation today as 
during the preceding centuries, is related to a, for a long time dominant, political (and 
juridical) understanding that the “indigenous question”, given time, would sort out itself 
through the “integration” of all indigenous people into Brazilian society as a whole. One can 
trace this concept from the Diretório dos Índios (a royal law conceived by the Marquis of 
Pombal in 1755) down to the Estatuto do Índio (Statute of Indians) of 1973, a law still in 
force, even if partly rendered obsolete by Brazil’s constitution of 1988. Quite modern in its 
definition of indigenous identity in near Barthian terms (“persons of pre-Colombian origin or 
descent who identify themselves and are identified as belonging to an ethnic group whose 
cultural characteristics distinguish them from society as a whole”), the Estatuto do Índio 
leaves no doubt that Indianness is a condition to be considered temporary. As laid down in its 
very first article, it is the purpose of the statute to not only protect Brazil’s indigenous 
population, but also “to integrate them, gradually and harmoniously, into the national 
community”.13 
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The tortoise and the hare 
Unexpectedly, to the legislator of the early 1970s, the contrary has happened. The Brazilian 
Institute for Statistics, which included the category “indigenous” in its population census from 
1991 on, reports for the year 2000 “a demographic growth above all expectations from 
294,000 to 734,000 individuals in only nine years”.14 In rural north-eastern Brazil, the number 
of people who declared themselves indígena rose more than 58% from the census of 2000 to 
the most recent one of 2010 (IBGE 2012: 12).
15
 Naturally, the growth of the indigenous 
population in rural areas has also heated up Brazil’s festering land-use conflicts, currently 
pitching against each other first and foremost the country’s agronegócio (agribusiness) and 
the inhabitants of indigenous territories in the process of legalization as indigenous 
reservations. 
The process of recognition of the indigenous reservation Terra Indígena Tupinambá de 
Olivença (TI Tupinambá) became official only in 2001 as a result of an (internal) FUNAI 
report on a research mission carried out in the district of Olivença “for the purpose of 
collecting data on the land claims of the Tupinambá Indians” (Paula 2001). Nearly a decade 
later, with the approval of the final report for the delimitation of the TI Tupinambá by the 
president of FUNAI in 2009 and its subsequent publication (DOU 74/2009), the proposed 
reservation completed the second most important stage of its legalization. Since then, it has 
been awaiting its official creation by means of a declaration by the Minister of Justice. 
According to the decree that regulates the demarcation of indigenous reservations, the 
Brazilian Ministry of Justice is legally responsible to take a final decision within a maximum 
of six months after the publication of the delimitation report.
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To pressure FUNAI and the Ministry of Justice to carry out their administrative duty in 
due time, the Tupinambá Indians eventually began to occupy several of the fazendas situated 
within the limits of their proposed Indigenous Reservation (see Magalhães 2010; Alarcon 
2013).
17
 The proprietors – most of whom hold legal land titles issued by the state government 
of Bahia – reacted by instituting proceedings, generally at the Court of Federal Justice of 
Ilhéus. At the time of writing, according to the federal judge who had taken office in early in 
2014, there were well over a hundred possessory actions still to be decided on within his 
judicial district. The earliest proceedings I came upon during my fieldwork in Ilhéus in the 
same year (I was granted permission to scrutinize a dozen case files in detail without any 
restrictions) date from 2004, which is actually the year when the first occupations of fazendas 
(called retomadas by the indigenous population, that is, “recaptures” or reoccupations) took 
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place. However, the fact that most of the legal proceedings have been ongoing for more than a 
decade now is not necessarily due to the tardiness of Brazilian civil justice. To give an 
example, in a lawsuit concerning the retomada of an estate located in an area called Serra do 
Padeiro, at the western tip of the TI Tupinambá, filed in December 2004, there have been 
more than a dozen decisions of first instance, and the case register (available on the internet) 
meticulously lists around 400 entries recording petitions, summons, appeals, etc.
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The case is typical in its toing and froing from the court of Ilhéus to the Higher Regional 
Court in Brasília. At the same time, it is unique as regards the identity of the claimant, who is 
not, as is usual, the proprietor or holder of the land title, but the indigenous community of 
Serra do Padeiro itself. In the petition that institutes the proceedings, Babau, the already 
mentioned leader of the Comunidade Indígena Tupinambá Serra do Padeiro, claims that: 
In view of the legislation in force and the legal opinions and decisions of the Higher Courts, the legitimate 
entitlement of the Tupinambá of Serra do Padeiro to the fazenda, which is being perturbed by the defendant 
party and out of which they are trying to expel [the claimants], proves to be unquestionable. Moreover, due 
to others’ will, [the claimants] are subjected to humiliations and constant violence, confined within small 
areas bare of resources, hindered from making use of what belongs to them and what is warranted to them 
by the Carta Magna. This being the case, nothing else remains to be done than to resort to the judiciary. The 
people of the Tupinambá village of Serra do Padeiro can only hope that justice prevails and peace will be re-
established, if late, after nearly 400 years of massacres and injustice. For hundreds of years, the great nation 
of Tupinambá from the village of Serra do Padeiro is crying and waiting for JUSTICE! 
Babau’s deliberations are testimony to the Tupinambás’ growing collective awareness of 
their rights as an indigenous people – a process that can be traced back to the late 1990s, 
though there had been various movements of resistance against indigenous 
disenfranchisement before then (see Paraiso 1987; 2009). The plaint of the Indians of Serra do 
Padeiro is also paradigmatic as to what constitutes the crux of all possessory actions: to 
decide which of the opposing parties has the “better” right of possession. While the 
Tupinambá of Serra do Padeiro claim that they are being hindered, by the defendant, from 
making use of the lands that belong to them by virtue of the Brazilian constitution, the 
defendant – acting as the plaintiff in an action regarding the same fazenda, filed by him two 
weeks after the Indians – asserts that it is he who should be considered a victim of disturbance 
of possession.
19
 
To understand the devious routes of the possessory actions regarding the TI Tupinambá 
(as those regarding many other indigenous regions throughout Brazil), it is worthwhile briefly 
to go back in time not just to the beginnings of Brazil’s colonization (the Jesuit village of 
Olivença was part of the Captaincy of São Jorge dos Ilhéus, donated in 1534), but to the days 
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of Ancient Rome. Modern European civil law owns a lot to Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, a 
legacy which is also very present in the Brazilian Código Civil of 2002 (which goes back to a 
draft from 1975), and which draws the same clear line between posse (possession) and 
propriedade (ownership) – a distinction which gradually emerged in the course of history of 
the Roman Republic. The legal concept of “possession” originated initially in connection with 
public lands, which were given out to individuals during the expansion of the Roman Empire, 
not as owners, but as possessors (Mousourakis 2012: 157). As Kaser notes, earlier in Roman 
history, the distinction between “ownership” and “possession” had still not taken shape: 
Generally speaking, in ancient Roman conception the relations between people and things is never 
understood from a merely proprietary perspective, that is, things are not considered assets at one’s free 
disposal. To the contrary, particularly in what concerns rural estate, the farm, with its living and lifeless 
stock, the awareness prevails that this epitome of material goods constitutes the basis of existence of the 
family, ensuring its future. This implies multifarious moral and legal commitments which limit its legal 
dominion […]. As a consequence of this very conception, the [peasant’s] house and fields enjoy sacral 
protection. Our present-day notion of property […] is only the result of a long development. […] Ancient 
Roman property, in contrast, was not yet dissociated sharply from possession. (Kaser 1955: 105) 
As “ownership”, based on legal entitlement, gradually differentiated itself from 
“possession”, that is, the factual control of a thing (or a piece of land), it became ever more 
important to provide legal means of protecting possession, as securing one’s right of property 
(through a vindicatio) demanded proof of ownership. This, however, “would in principle 
require [the owner] to prove that the person from whom he had acquired the thing was then its 
owner. That of course would turn on whether that person had acquired from the person who 
was then the owner; and so on ad infinitum” (Johnston 1999: 55). The possessory interdicta 
was held out to solve this problem: “In comparison with the regular proceedings of actiones, 
they held the advantage of tightness and swiftness, which was given also to all the other 
interdicts, owing to their administrative public law character” (Kaser 1955: 325). 
So far, so good. The trouble is that, be it in Ancient Rome or in modern Brazil, even 
interdicts cannot exclusively rely on the factuality of possession. Even the interdictas, Kaser 
cautions, “only provided relative protection, they decided in favour of the party with the 
‘better’ possession than the adverse party. The possession was considered ‘worse’ if the 
adverse party had obtained it in a defective way, namely by force, clandestinely or by grant at 
will” (1955: 123). Similarly, Article 922 of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure gives 
formal expression to the relativeness of all ações possessórias: “It is admissible that the 
defendant, alleging that he was infringed in his possession, [himself] demands possessory 
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action […]”. And, not much different from Roman law, the Civil Code declares: “It is just the 
possession which is not forcible, clandestine or precarious” (Art. 1200, emphasis added). 
Before taking a closer look at the manner with which the Brazilian judiciary has been 
dealing with question of “possession” in the case of the territories disputed by the Tupinambá 
Indians, it is worth pointing out another commonality between ancient European and modern 
Brazilian rural society, in what refers to differing concepts underlying the use of land. To the 
indigenous population currently living within the limits of the not-yet-declared TI Tupinambá, 
the meaning of land is still very different from that ascribed to it by many of their legal 
opponents. Various scholars have pointed to the prevalent Tupinambá notion of land not as a 
good or property, but a “place where existence materializes” (Lara 2012: 56). Kaser’s (1955: 
105) reference to the “moral commitments” attached to “things” (including land) and the 
“sacral protection” a peasant’s house and lands enjoyed – not as property, but as sources of 
family life – matches, for instance, with Viegas’ observation of the Tupinambás’ “total 
identification of a person and their house”, a relation “which is not mediated by a relation of 
alienable property […] but by bonds of personal responsibility” (Viegas 2007: 86). Viegas 
thus attributes part of the Tupinambás’ massive land losses from the 1940s to 1960s – when 
many Indians sold or bartered their land possessions to cacao farmers from Ilhéus for “a bottle 
of cachaça [rum]” or to clear their debts – to what she terms “equivocal compatibilities” 
(2007: 265). Pieces of land that, within indigenous reasoning, were seen as areas that only 
potentially would turn into a lugar, a place where families would exist and subsist – within 
the Tupinambá’s conception of life as an interminable “circle of abandonment/revitalization” 
(2007: 266) – to their trade “partners” from the city of Ilhéus was terreno, real property that 
could be, and demanded to be, the object of ownership, independent of its actual use. 
The same diverging notions of land were prominent in the courtroom of the Court of 
Federal Justice of Ilhéus, in 2014. Unlike his predecessors, who regularly had seen no 
necessity to hear the indigenous defendants of the possessory actions filed by fazendeiros 
(estate owners), the newly arrived judge, in an attempt to “pour oil on troubled waters”, as he 
called it, endeavoured to achieve temporary settlements between the opposing parties, until a 
final decision as to the demarcation of the reservation would be taken by the Ministry of 
Justice. Unexpectedly, indigenous peasants and title-holding estate owners were thus forced 
to sit together, discussing their different points of view regarding the disputed lands. While 
the judged managed to induce the opposing parties to compromise in numerous actions, it also 
became clear how different their demands actually were. The proprietors (who often did not 
live on their estates but entrusted the agricultural work to an administrator and/or a reduced 
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number of agricultural labourers) were eager to detail the economic losses they had suffered 
in the wake of the retomadas. Explaining the troubles of “professional” agriculture, one of the 
estate owners came to admire “how the Indians actually manage to survive” on her farm. On 
the other side, in the same case, the Tupinambá made a point of explaining how the fields 
they were tilling for subsistence agriculture provided for so and so many families, and that 
their main concern would be “to have land that really belongs to us”. The judge’s proposal 
that the indigenous occupants, for the time being, should work as paid labourers on the 
occupied fazenda, while it would still legally be possessed by the non-Indian proprietor, was 
hence categorically rejected by one of the responsible caciques: “We may withdraw from the 
land if necessary, but work on it as employees, never!” 
Law, law enforcement and law suits as acts of social sense-making 
But what about the question of the “justness” of the possession of either the Tupinambá or the 
title-holding fazendeiros? Putting aside, for the moment, the problem of “material” justness, 
that is, the fairness of the Tupinambá’s demand to be allowed to inhabit the territories that had 
belonged to them, as a dynamic ethnic group, for centuries, the problem of “formal” legal 
justness of either party’s possession is juridically rather intricate. According to its (post-
dictatorship) constitution of 1988, the Federative Republic of Brazil “recognizes the Indians’ 
[…] primordial rights over the lands they traditionally occupy” (CF 1988: Art. 231). The 
indigenous population, though, is not the proprietor of these lands – which legally belong to 
the Federation (Art. 20/XI) – but enjoys the right of their “permanent possession” (Art. 
231§3). Moreover, the constitution declares all indigenous lands to be “inalienable and 
inviolable, and the rights over them irrevocable” (Art. 231§4). To an advocate of indigenous 
rights, these lines of the Brazilian constitution must sound quite utopian, especially if 
compared to the situation of indigenous people in other continents (like Australia). For many 
indigenous people in Brazil though, the full implementation of their constitutional rights is 
rather part of a Utopia that has yet to develop. The period of five years allotted for the 
demarcation of all the country’s indigenous reservations (ADCT 1988: Art. 67) has long 
passed, and political movements to severely limit precisely these constitutional rights have 
gained force in the meantime.
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As mentioned, most of the fazendeiros within the TI Tupinambá do in fact hold legal titles 
for their estates, issued either by the state of Bahia or even the federal government. Formally, 
this fact itself does not undermine the Tupinambás’ demands: the constitution determines 
explicitly that all such titles are to be considered “null and void, not producing any legal 
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effect” (Art. 231§6) – although, in the case of the neighbouring Pataxó Hã-Hã-Hãe Indians, it 
took the STF 30 years to finally recognize that (see Zoettl 2016). At the same time, within 
possessory actions, the question of ownership is irrelevant altogether, as their purpose as a 
legal remedy is to protect the factuality of a given instance of the exercise of power over a 
certain “thing”. On these grounds, the Tupinambás’ argument that the lands they had re-taken 
actually belong to them by act of the constitution, has regularly been rejected by the courts of 
first instance. As the new judge of Ilhéus wrote, shortly after taking office and probably still 
under the influence of his local juridical assessors, as a representative of the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) speculated, “what is being discussed in the present possessory 
action is not the demarcation of the Tupinambás’ lands […]. As long as the Indigenous 
Territory is not yet delimited, the possession has to be safeguarded of whoever is effectively 
exercising it.”21 
To cut a long story short, it suffices to note here that the legal interpretation of the 
question of indigenous possession, as opposed to the possessory rights of the fazendeiros is 
not only complex but, like most points of law, subject to differing interpretation. As opposed 
to the cited judge’s opinion, FUNAI, MPF and the legal representatives of the federal 
government (all of them responsible, according to the constitution, for defending the legal 
interests of Brazil’s indigenous population), regularly defend the primacy of indigenous 
possession over the private possession conceded by the Civil Code. Taking up their 
arguments, a federal judge from the neighbouring district of Itabuna, in another possessory 
action regarding the TI Tupinambá, considered that “be there or not occupation by private 
persons, indigenous people regularly do not lose their possession of an area, as it is 
‘permanent’, a characteristic which detaches it from the civil/private regime of possession”.22 
Accordingly, the STF has repeatedly clarified that the constitutional right of indigenous 
possession does not depend on its administrative demarcation, which is to be considered a 
merely “declaratory” act (STF 2010: 237). 
Reflecting on the above mentioned lawsuit of the Pataxó Hã-Hã-Hãe Indians at the STF 
(which ended in 2012 with a long-awaited victory for the indigenous population of the TI 
Caramuru-Paraguaçu), I argued that the court proceedings, publicly re-enacting the “drama” 
of the Hã-Hã-Hãe, and themselves drawing on dramatic forms of representation, could be 
interpreted, in (Victor) Turnerian terms, as a “cultural performance” which stages, in the 
court’s plenary hall, a variety of social conflicts inherent in modern Brazilian society (Zoettl 
2016). The “lawfare” of and against the Tupinambá Indians, at its present stage, differs from 
that of the Hã-Hã-Hãe though, in that it has not yet reached, as far as its legal side is 
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concerned, the publicity and public visibility of the widely noticed “final battle” of its 
parentes (kin) from Caramuru-Paraguaçu, less than 100 km away. Apart from a single judge 
decision on the part of Joaquim Barbosa, then president of the STF until his early retirement 
in 2014, which suspended more than a dozen eviction orders,
23
 the great majority of lawsuits 
concerning Tupinambá are processed in a tiny room in the Federal Court of Ilhéus, hardly 
noticed by the general public. 
What becomes publicly known, through media coverage on an often nationwide level, are 
the frequent actions of the Federal Police against individual Tupinambá Indians or the forced 
evictions of whole Tupinambá villages. Babau, the cacique from Serra do Padeiro, has been 
repeatedly arrested on dubious grounds by the State Police (polícia militar) or local agents of 
the Federal Police, put into custody by means of local courts’ decisions, yet regularly released 
on the grounds of habeas corpus by the higher courts. The writs that have come to Babau’s aid 
– if sometimes after he had already spent months behind bars – are occasionally full of 
comments that show how disconcerted the higher judges are by the modus operandi of the 
lower courts and the police: “the person concerned [o paciente] was detained only seven 
months after obtaining the arrest warrant”, “[he] has been imprisoned for 90 days without any 
notice of formalization of the complaint”, “the Federal Prosecutor’s Office [MPF] itself, in 
the trial of first instance […] pleaded against [his] imprisonment”, “the decision of the court 
of first instance which ordered the remand in custody hardly refers to the person concerned, 
limiting itself to referring to statements of unknown witnesses”, “the access to these 
statements, surprisingly, was restricted to the police authorities and the prosecution, excluding 
the defence”, etc.24 
Clifford Geertz has advocated a “hermeneutic” perspective on law, which would seek to 
transcend functionalist approaches that interpret law as either “a clever device to keep people 
from tearing one another limb from limb, advance the interests of the dominant classes, [or] 
defend the rights of the weak against the predations of the strong […]” (1983: 232). Thinking 
of the Tupinambá case, it sometimes seems difficult not to interpret law, legal procedure and 
the action of judges and law enforcement officers as a device to maintain a certain political, 
economic and historic situation literally in statu quo res erant ante bellum. The persecution of 
the people who identify themselves today as Tupinambá has run through the centuries, and 
has usually been administered through close cooperation between the local elite, personified 
by the so-called Coronéis do Cacau (cocoa colonels), local and state government agents, the 
judiciary and the police. After what became known as the revolt of “caboclo” Marcellino in 
the 1930s (an uprising against the construction of a bridge over the River Cururupe to 
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facilitate access from Ilhéus to the indigenous territories near Olivença), it looked as if the 
remaining population’s resistance had finally been broken. Marcellino, vilified by the press as 
“Lampião Mirim” (“the tiny bandit”), charged by the judiciary with crimes as diverse as 
murder, defloration or “being communist”, hunted first by the police of Ilhéus and later by 
Bahian government troops, eventually disappeared under suspicious circumstances around 
1937; many of his indigenous companions were subjected to torture during the pursuit (see 
Alarcon 2013; Paraiso 1987; 2009). 
Half a century later, the Bahian historian Maria Hilda Paraiso (1987: 105) observed that 
“[o]nly now, in 1984, can we notice a recommencement of a movement that aims to recover 
the [Tupinambás’] lands and their recognition by the state’s Bureau [of Indian Affairs]”. The 
indigenous population’s “gatherings during which they seek to strengthen their ties of 
solidarity and revive their cultural practices”, Paraiso went on, “have already provoked 
reactions from the residents of Ilhéus and Olivença, including criminal complaints at the 
Federal Police” (1987: 105). A brief look into the report of the “Special Commission on 
Tupinambá” of the National Council for the Defence of Human Rights (CDDPH), instituted 
to “map the police investigations, administrative procedures and judicial processes which 
involve indigenous leaders”,25 gives an idea of how local and federal institutions continue, 
another 25 years after this latest resurgence of the Tupinambá movement, to work hand in 
hand to undermine the Tupinambás’ efforts to actualize their constitutional rights. To cite just 
one example, under the chapter heading “History of violence against and imprisonment of 
Tupinambá leaders”, the report lists, for 23 October 2008, the following incident: 
Police operation in the village of Serra do Padeiro, with more than 130 police officers, 2 helicopters and 30 
vehicles – including funeral cars – to execute judicial eviction orders which had been suspended by the TRF 
of the First Region [regional appeal court] and against the advice of the Ministry of Justice, resulting in 22 
indigenous people injured by rubber bullets and intoxications by bombs and gas, destruction of houses, 
community vehicles, food and school equipment. The officers of the Federal Police took away spears, clubs, 
arrows and burned headdresses, breechcloths, maracas, in short, indigenous attire, in flagrant violation of the 
cultural rights of the Tupinambá, an indictable offence according to law 6001/73. (CDDPH 2011: 35) 
In what way could the anthropologist endeavour to make sense, in Geertzian terms, of 
such a blatant persecution of an ethnic minority in the 21st century in a democracy, albeit a 
young one? Are the bureaucratization of indigenous identity, the judicialization of indigenous 
rights and lives and the criminalization of indigenous leaders and individuals by state agents 
and the judiciary not simply different aspects of what Bourdieu (1987: 838) has called 
(referring to law) an attempt to consecrate “the established order by consecrating the vision of 
that order which is held by the State”? Although such a way of looking at things may not be 
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completely wrong, it partly ignores the complex dynamics underlying the processes of 
making and applying the law, and the relation of these processes to the “bigger” dynamics of 
negotiation of societal interests. Even Bourdieu, who emphasizes predominantly the latent 
power of “symbolic domination” inherent in legal norms (1987: 846), does not refrain from 
pointing to the importance of law in the symbolic and actual brokering of social conflicts. 
While, at one point, Bourdieu exposes the arbitrariness of and the “rationalization process” 
behind legal reasoning, he also comes to consider judicial acts as representations of societal 
disputes. One could conceptualize trials, Bourdieu suggests, as the “paradigmatic staging of 
the symbolic struggle inherent in the social world: a struggle in which differing, indeed 
antagonistic world-views confront each other” (1987: 837). Within the same line of reasoning, 
Bourdieu describes the judiciary as “a specialized body […] responsible for organizing the 
public representation of social conflicts according to established forms” (1987: 830f). 
Bourdieu’s sociology of the “juridical field” is thus not necessarily antagonistic to Geertz’s 
symbolic-interpretative view of law as being “constructive of social life not reflective, or 
anyway not just reflective” (1983: 218). But while Bourdieu does not refrain from denouncing 
legal procedure as a ritual “designed to intensify the authority of the act of interpretation” and 
the interpretation of law as a “symbolic struggle between professionals possessing unequal 
technical skills and social influence” (1987: 827), Geertz advocates a – perhaps more 
relativistic – view of law as “a distinctive manner of imagining the real” (1983: 173). 
Both the meandering of the Tupinambá case through the various instances of the Brazilian 
judiciary, as much as the juridification (and criminalization) of indigenous identity itself are 
not bare of elements that recommend a Bourdieusian and/or Geertzian perspective on them to 
overcome a purely “instrumentalist” view (criticized by Bourdieu himself) of legal and state 
actors and actions as merely reflecting “existing social power relations” and the “interests of 
dominant groups” (1987: 814). As a matter of fact, the Tupinambá worldview and interests 
have not only been defended, at great sacrifice, by the Tupinambá themselves and some of 
their allies (such as, for instance, the Conselho Indigenista Missionário), but also by various 
actors of the “judicial field”. The MPF of Ilhéus, for instance, has peremptorily refused to 
press charges against Indians for trespassing on land (esbulho possessório), arguing that the 
Tupinambá retomadas would be a legitimate part of their struggle (cf. Alarcon 2013: 69). 
Many preliminary first instance eviction orders have been suspended by the higher courts, 
occasionally on the grounds of a remarkably insightful argumentation. The presiding judge of 
the Tribunal Regional Federal of the First Region (TRF1), for instance, in a decision taken the 
day before the execution of the contested eviction order, deemed that the first instance 
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decision to concede such an order “by way of preliminary injunction, that is, without 
exhaustive analysis of the causa” – the usual processual form taken in all possessory actions 
against the Tupinambá – would be “precipitant and imprudent”; all the more so as “the 
execution of the decision […] may pose a serious risk to the security of the Tupinambá 
indigenous community and the police agents.”26 In the already cited decision of the 
constitutional court, Joaquim Barbosa, at that time Brazil’s most senior judge, cautioned 
against the fact that “in most cases, the eviction of occupants does not involve any prospect of 
dignified [future] accommodation” and ruled that “to avoid the constant and involuntary 
relocation of the population” was a “precaution as important as that of securing the duly 
execution of judicial injunctions”.27 In view of the persecution of Tupinambá Indians by state 
agents, the MPF of Ilhéus has recently filed a civil action claiming that the Brazilian state 
should pay R$500,000 (around US$200,000) to the Tupinambá community for “acts of 
violence and torture” perpetrated by Federal Police agents during criminal “investigations” at 
a retomada during which, according to the MPF, indigenous activists were tortured by means 
of Taser weapons.
28
 As for the attacks on indigenous rights by the media, the MPF of São 
Paulo has filed a civil action against the publisher of Veja magazine for defamation (dano 
moral) of indigenous (and black rural) communities in the already cited article on the 
“Jamboree of opportunist anthropology”.29 Then again, with respect to the erratic 
bureaucratization of indigenous lives, the MPF of Roraima (a state at the northern tip of 
Brazil) has filed a civil action regarding the university’s non-acceptance of indigenous self-
identification for fellowships.
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The symbolic struggle Bourdieu identifies in the proceedings of the different legal actors 
is however, at least as far as the legal treatment of indigenous lives in Brazil is concerned, less 
a question of differences in technical skills and social influences than, more generally, 
shifting societal paradigms that make certain judgments, at a certain point in history, socially 
“acceptable” or not. To give an example from another legal domain, Brazil has recently 
witnessed an unprecedented and widely unexpected crackdown on politico-economical 
corruption, spearheaded by federal and constitutional judges, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office 
and the Federal Police. A number of the highest-ranking officials of the ruling Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT) have been convicted in 2013 by the STF and given prison sentences 
without parole for their involvement in a congressional vote-buying system which became 
famous as the mensalão (“big monthly allowance”). At the end of 2014, the Federal Police 
jailed a number of highest-ranking members of the executive boards of some of the country’s 
biggest companies in an operation named “Lava jato” (“car wash”), following a judicial 
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inquiry which disclosed a multi-billion dollar corruption scheme within the state-owned 
energy corporation Petrobras; in March 2015 the STF authorized criminal investigations 
against 34 members of the National Congress, including the presidents of the Federal Senate 
and the Congress, for suspicion of complicity and passive corruption. 
Regarding indigenous rights, though, some of the STF’s very recent decisions seem to 
indicate a further paradigm shift, which could prove particularly unfavourable to those 
indigenous groups who are still struggling to see their traditional territories demarcated. In 
late 2014, the second chamber of the STF overruled a decision of the highest non-
constitutional court (STJ) on the grounds that only those territories could be demarcated 
which had been occupied by indigenous people on the very day of the promulgation of the 
country’s actual constitution (of 5 October 1988) – no matter by what means the indigenous 
inhabitants had been driven out of their territories, and even if this had occurred only the day 
before – thus categorically dismissing the rights conferred on them by virtue of Brazil’s 
earlier constitutions.
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The STF’s changing juridical stances, of course, also reflect changes of the political 
balance of power (not necessarily related to this or that ruling party, but often rather to the 
shifting influence certain lobby groups enjoy within the governing coalition) – not least 
because the judges of the STF are nominated by the President in office. At the same time, 
Brazil’s supreme court has never denied its political responsibility, in the sense of assuming 
and acknowledging its role as a kind of final referee for a near indefinite variety of social 
disputes (see Paixão 2007). This political side of judicial reasoning frequently shines through 
the lines of the published grounds for the court’s decisions as, for instance, when one of the 
judges of the above cited decision “initiate[s] [her] vote with the disquiet of being aware of 
the difficulty of finding, judicially, a solution that attends equally to the anxieties of the 
indigenous community which has long since been dispossessed of their lands, and the farmer 
determined to work for the country’s inland development […]”.32 
The (alleged) antagonism between indigenous minorities’ rights and the “national” 
interest of the country’s economic development has indeed become, for the moment, the way 
Brazil’s indigenous question is predominantly “imagined” within public discourse. This not 
only includes the – mostly biased – media coverage of “clashes” between indigenous peasants 
and (supposedly small-scale) agriculturalists, but also, and not necessarily in a biased way, the 
“juridical field”. One may lament this (hopefully fugacious) paradigm which reduces a socio-
cultural issue to one of mostly “late liberalist” (Povinelli 2011) economics – a perspective 
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against which one of the STF’s ministers had actually cautioned in another recent key 
decision.
33
 It nevertheless represents both, in Geertz’s words, a “mode of giving particular 
sense to particular things in particular places” and a “set of practical attitudes toward the 
management of controversy” (1983: 232, 184). 
Geertz’s hermeneutic view of law would be stretched to its limits, though, if it had to 
make allowance for even for those manoeuvres of state power that seek to suspend the action 
of law altogether. Brazil’s military dictatorship has bequeathed the country a cunning legal 
remedy called suspensão de segurança (“suspension of security”) that allows public legal 
entities to plead to the higher court’s president for the suspension, by simple order, of any 
previous court decision, by alleging that it would do “severe damage to public order, health, 
security or economy”.34 The “suspension of security” has been and is being amply used by 
Brazil’s present government to push through large-scale construction projects that jeopardize 
the cultural and physical existence of various indigenous tribes in the country’s north. Several 
court decisions, for instance, that suspended the construction of Belo Monte Dam on the 
Xingu River in the state of Pará on the grounds of gross procedural errors (such as lack of 
prior consultation of the indigenous communities, illegality of the environmental impact 
statement, etc.), have themselves been suspended – without considering the substance of the 
case – by means of an order of “suspension of security”, in what one of the MPF’s public 
prosecutors from Pará has called a suspension of legal order itself (Santi and Brum 2014). 
“In the modern era,” observes Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “law has become the 
privileged way of imagining, representing, and distorting, that is to say, of mapping” of social 
spaces (1987: 286). While the Tupinambá at least won’t see their traditional territories 
flooded for the benefit of “national economy” (represented at Belo Monte, as it happens, by a 
consortium of some of Brazil’s biggest private companies, some of which are currently being 
investigated for their participation in the “car wash” corruption scheme), they still struggle to 
be allowed to make use of what is theirs by virtue of the country’s constitution. Much more 
than written law itself, it is legal procedure that has become the script for the public 
assessment of the Tupinambás’ (and other Indians’) demands, and their very right to exist 
within Brazilian society at large – a script written dynamically by a multitude of different 
judicial actors proposing, to the Brazilian public, a multitude of different ways of “imagining” 
the country’s contemporary and future social reality. However, as the acts of the “judicial 
field” depend not only on the intrinsic “rules of the game” of judicial procedure but also on 
the legitimacy ascribed to them a priori and a posteriori by society at large, it is, ultimately, 
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the Brazilian public itself that will have to decide on the “just” interpretation of the 
“indigenous question”, as laid before them by the country’s judiciary. 
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